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2025-03-23 20:40:24

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CATO JOURNAL
frequently reiterated objective of moving to capital account convert-
ibility. In all likelihood loan quality deteriorated significantly in 2003
and in the first quarter of 2004. Over the next few years as the
authorities seek to reduce the rate of growth of fixed-asset investment
spending to bring the investment share of gross domestic product to
a more sustainable level, the economy will likely slow, perhaps sig-
nificantly. This slowdown in top-line growth in the corporate sector
will likely be accompanied by an even more significant decline in
profitability. In sectors in which investment was characterized by the
central bank as “blind expansion of low quality, duplicative building”
the emergence of excess capacity likely will put further downward
pressure on prices and profitability (People’s Bank of China 2004: 30).
Thus, a significant share of the massive increase in lending that oc-
curred between the start of 2002Q4 through 2004Q1 could become
nonperforming. In the first three years of the last downturn (1994
through 1996), 40 percent of a smaller boom in credit extended in
1989–93 became nonperforming, even on the rather lax loan classi-
fication criteria prevailing at the time.
China’s leadership has long understood the risks of liberalizing the
capital account when large portions of its banking system are insol-
vent. To date it has allocated more than RMB 2 trillion to improve the
balance sheets of insolvent financial institutions. Much of this may be
washed out by the new nonperforming loans that emerge in 2005–07.
Household savings deposits in state-owned banks at mid-year 2004
amounted to about RMB 12 trillion, an amount slightly more than 100
percent of gross domestic product in 2003. Few depositors have had
the chance to diversify the currency composition of their financial
assets. If capital account convertibility is introduced while portions of
the banking system remain insolvent, banks could face disinterme-
diation that could lead to a banking crisis.

Conclusion
China’s current leadership appears to have failed to understand the
lessons of China’s last macroeconomic cycle and appeared to believe
that they could use unprecedented monetary expansion to achieve
their pro-growth agenda. They resisted the efforts of the central bank
to consider greater exchange rate flexibility as a tool that would both
reduce aggregate demand and also allow the use of interest rate policy
to slow the pace of investment spending. As a result fixed-asset in-
vestment grew at the fastest pace in a decade, driving the investment
share of gross domestic product to within a percentage point of the
previous all-time high in 1993.

POLICY IN CHINA

The central bank by the third quarter of 2004 had achieved some
success in bringing down the rate of credit growth to a more sustain-
able level. That, in turn, contributed to a marginal slowdown in fixed-
asset investment. But it is far premature to declare that China is on a
glide path to a so-called soft landing. China’s monetary authorities
need to maintain moderate credit growth for a period of several years
to successfully lower the investment share of gross domestic product
to a more sustainable level. That, in turn, will likely take as much as
four to five percentage points off the growth rate. The slowdown is
likely to lead to an increase in nonperforming loans that could be of
a magnitude to substantially set back the government’s program to
raise the capital adequacy of China’s banks. The latter is a key pre-
requisite to a full liberalization of the capital account. Thus, the un-
intended consequence of excessive monetary stimulus in 2003 could
be a further delay in liberalizing the capital account.
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